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ABSTRACT
This Article presents a case study in designing cooperative interstate institutions.
It takes as its subject the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”), a
recently-developed compact among the States now awaiting congressional ratification.
The SSUTA’s primary goal is to bring uniformity to the field of state and local sales
taxation, a regime in which multi-jurisdictional sellers now confront literally thousands of
different sets of rules. I predict here that the SSUTA as currently designed is unlikely to
accomplish that goal, and attempt to suggest possible amendments that could improve its
expected performance. From these efforts I extract larger lessons about the workings of
many similar cooperative ventures.
My prognosis for the SSUTA turns largely on the political economy of state
taxation. Extending Daniel Shaviro’s seminal work on state incentives for tax-law
disuniformity, I examine how the institutional arrangements set out by the SSUTA
respond to the pressures identified by Shaviro. I additionally weigh a number of factors
omitted in his analysis. For example, I consider the possible public-regarding tendencies
of bureaucratic ideology or sense of mission among either state-level tax administrators,
state courts, or the governing body of the SSUTA. I also examine the possibility that
ongoing intervention by Congress or a reviewing federal court might help either to check
rent-seeking by, or instill a stronger sense of public regard in, the SSUTA Governing
Board and state-level actors.
I find none of these alternatives especially promising. For example, federal
judicial review is often offered as a panacea by present critics of the SSUTA. However,
it was precisely the relative incompetence of federal judges in balancing the goods of
uniformity against the possible autonomy and experimental benefits of diversity that lead
the Supreme Court to, in essence, punt the problem back to Congress. And the failure of
local businesses to internalize the costs of national disuniformity likely distorts the
decisions not only of state politicians and bureaucrats but also of state courts and
Congress.
Having made a more precise diagnosis of the problems that confront the SSUTA,
I am able to suggest more precisely targeted solutions. Somewhat radically, I propose
tying the deductibility of businesses’ federal deduction for state and local tax paid to
federal administrative approval of the taxing state’s compliance with SSUTA, with
approval subject in turn to federal judicial review. In this way, the businesses are made
to internalize the costs they impose on others. And the most politically remote actors,
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federal judges, would have a reliable interpretive partner to supplement their own,
ordinarily rather weak, fact finding and policy analysis.
Finally, I claim that this analysis is generalizable. It helps to evidence the
weakness of nationwide policy making that is dependent purely either on unmitigated
“market” federalism, or on relatively rigid and uninformed judicial mandates. And it
opens the possibility that conditional taxes, like conditional spending, can be a significant
tool in coordinating our national policy goals.
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Introduction
One of the strengths of the U.S. Constitution is that it draws up a fairly open floor
plan for arranging the internal architecture of government. Justice Kennedy, for example,
has likened the invention of federalism to a sort of Manhattan Project of political
philosophy.1 With largely autonomous sub-national governments, we get tremendous
opportunities for experiments in the goals and design of government.2 But, of course, the

1

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); David L. Shapiro,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 85--88 (1995); Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism
and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749--76 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60--69 (1998); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,
82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 381--82, 386--405 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Limits of Power:
2
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jostling of so many different political bodies also leads to serious collective action
problems, as the Articles of Confederation experience taught us.3
Fortunately, then, the Constitution also seems to offer many different avenues for
coordinating national and local policies. The menu includes prescriptive federal
legislation,4 judicially-enforced constitutional rights,5 compacts among states,6 and offers
of federal or other grants in exchange for state agreements,7 among many others. Each of
these, in turn, can involve many different permutations. An agreement might be held

Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2217 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Three Faces of
Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1575 (1994).
3
E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay); THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton); James Madison,
Vices of the Policial System of the U. States (April 1787), reprinted in 24 LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS: 1774-1789 at 265 (Paul H. Smith ed. 1996); JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 29--30 (statement of Edmund Randolph) (Adrienne Koch ed. 1984);
PATRICK T. CONLEY AND JOHN P. KAMINSKI, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES 25--26, 58, 202 (1988);
PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1775-1787 at 8--20, 122 (1983); Richard E. Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1256--66 (1997). For a thorough grounding in the theory of collective action problems, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF Groups (1962);
TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992).
4
For a careful theoretical description and, in part, condemnation of this approach, see Richard B. Stewart,
Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 328--35 (1987); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive
Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86, 89--102 (1986).
5
Of course, there are many senses in which we can describe constitutional rights as a way of shaping
national policy. For instance, there is the communitarian sense in which the Constitution helps to define
the limits of our political community and the meaning that attaches to membership in it. See, e.g., Frank
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503--15 (1988); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,
International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1392--94 (1999)
(describing constitutional treatment of immigration as part of definition of national identity). Then,
perhaps one metaphysical step down, there is the sense in which constitutional rights are expressions of
national ideals of justice, which states are not free to contradict. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 185 (1980); Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New
Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 127--30. And then there
is the more pedestrian (but still important) sense in which constitutional rights serve an almost mechanical
role in implementing good policy, as by preventing inefficient state interference with commerce, or
remedying other kinds of collective action problems. See Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace
Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV.
155, 209--10 (2004); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33, 49-59 (1985). There may also be others.
6
WILLIAM KEVIN VOIT, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS & AGENCIES 10--13, 158--59
(2003) (identifying over 200 compacts); see Ann Bowman, Horizontal Federalism: Exploring Interstate
Interactions, 14 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 535, 535--46 (2004); Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate
Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FL. L. REV. 1, 2--7 (1997); see
generally Felix Frankfurter & John Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution---A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925).
7
See Galle, Getting Spending, supra note 5, at 185--86.
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together by the threat of private suits,8 by the judgments of a new quasi-governmental
entity established under the agreement,9 by a third-party government arbiter,10 by public
and stakeholder pressure in response to data disclosed about the performance of the
parties to the agreement,11 or merely by mutual interest in its continued existence. The
rules for each of these enforcement functions, too, vary widely.
Again, the pre-constitutional era showed us clearly that the institutional design of
our interstate arrangements can be crucial to their success or failure. If we choose
unwisely, we may end up with a problem worse than the one we started out to solve.
This Article does not attempt a grand, high-level theory of interstate institutions.
Others have undertaken that mission, often impressively.12 My focus, instead, is much
closer to the ground. I want to get at how, in actual practice, we can apply the theory of
institutional design to particular challenges in interstate coordination. In order to do that,
I have adopted a case-study approach. I take a single policy challenge, and describe

8

Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 667--71 (2000); Brian D.
Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983? A Theoretical Approach, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 163, 203--05 (2003) (describing role of private suits under 26 USC ' 1983 in promoting
collaborative regulatory systems). For those who might wonder how the States can, by their mutual
consent, create a federal cause of action, it is worth noting that Congress, in approving a compact, can
provide for tools for its enforcement that would not be available to the States alone. Virginia v. West
Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 602 (1918).
9
E.g., New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (U.S. 1921); see JOSEPH F.
ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS (2002).
10
See DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD Washington 182, 189--91
(1995) (discussing -- and decrying -- expansion of federal agencies in controlling relationships between
states through federal spending programs).
11
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267, 314, 321 (1998); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 308--13 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation:
TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 363--70 (2001).
12
E.g., THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2001);
Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person / One Vote and Local Government, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
339 (1993); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 11; Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1997); Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulatory Pluralism: Designing
Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The
Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004).
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existing state and federal efforts to address it. Then, I unpack those existing efforts and,
using what we know about how institutions work, try to rebuild them to better realize the
policy goal. In the process, I uncover several significant, generalizable lessons about the
pragmatics of institutional design. The policy challenge I have selected is a timely one:
the threat posed to state and local budgets by sales into their jurisdictions from far away,
particularly in the fast-growing area of sales over the internet.13
The rise of electronic commerce is something like the global warming of state
finance. That is, it is a problem of the States’ own making that is not urgent now but may
someday not far away leave them deep underwater. The States, of course, did not invent
the internet. But it is largely their own fault that the exploding market for goods and
services sold over the internet may put them in dire financial straits. Fortunately, they
may have a serviceable patch already on its way, called the Streamlined Sales and Use
Tax Agreement (“SSUTA”).14 Unfortunately, as I will try to show, in its present form it
faces many serious challenges.
Why does e-commerce affect state budgets? States depend heavily on sales and
use tax15 revenues – some states draws upwards of 40% of their revenues from them.16
Although e-commerce is still a relatively small portion of total nationwide retail sales, in

13

For some earlier scholarly discussions of the scope of this problem, see Kendall L. Houghton & Walter
Hellerstein, State Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Perspectives on Proposals for Change and Their
Constitutionality, 2000 BYU L. REV. 9, 10--12, 51; Walter Hellerstein, Deconstructing the Debate Over
State Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 13 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 549 (2000); Walter Hellerstein, State and
Local Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Reflections on the Emerging Issues, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691
(1998).
14
Available at < http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/agreement.htm>.
15
A “use” tax is simply a tax imposed on the in-state use of a good or service purchased out of state; it is
designed to make state purchasers indifferent between purchasing in and out of state.
16
See U.S. Census Bureau, State Government Tax Collections 2005, available at
<http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/statetax/05staxss.xls>.
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nominal terms the figures are already very substantial.17 And the proportion is growing
quickly.18 As the United States transitions to a knowledge-based economy, more and
more of what we produce that is of value to consumers will be readily ordered or
acquired from our computer chair or our set-top cable box.19 Current estimates of the
cost of e-commerce to the States over the next few years range from a few billion to tens
of billions of dollars.20 If states continue to depend on sales taxes, they will have to find
ways to tax these transactions.
Unfortunately, the States have made it hard on themselves in that regard. Over
the past few decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Dormant Commerce
Clause to dramatically limit the authority of states and other local taxing jurisdictions to
oblige non-local sellers to collect sales and use taxes – in essence, only sellers with a
“physical presence” in the jurisdiction need comply with the jurisdiction’s demands.21
That rule, arguably, arose in response to the States’ irresponsibility in allowing such a
bewildering array of state and local sales tax rules to develop. The Court, turn, seems to
have felt compelled to act in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of an open
market for domestic goods against the threat of rules so cumbersome in their multiplicity
that interstate trade would diminish.

17

For example, although e-commerce made up only about 1.7 percent of all U.S. 2003 retail sales, that
represented $56 billion in sales. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, E-Stats, E-Commerce 2003 Highlights (May 11,
2005), available at <www.census.gov/estats>.
18
For instance, the percentage of e-commerce as a portion of all retail sales roughly tripled between 2000
and 2005, and grew at a fairly steady rate throughout that period. U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail ECommerce Sales 2nd Quarter 2005, at 1 (Aug. 19, 2005).
19
Houghton & Hellerstein, supra note 13, at 12--13; Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and
Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 41-42
(2003).
20
See Multistate Tax Commission, Federalism at Risk, 2003 STATE TAX TODAY 217-4, at [6]; George S.
Isaacson, A Promise Unfulfilled: How the Streamlined Sales Tax Project Failed to Meet Its Own Goals for
Simplification of State Sales and Use Taxes, 2003 STATE TAX TODAY 207-5, at [17] (summarizing
competing estimates).
21
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311--15 (1992).
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The Court’s interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, can be
superseded by Congress. Thus, in the last several years the States have developed the
SSUTA, a multi-lateral agreement among states designed to harmonize their sales tax in
exchange for congressional authorization to impose collection obligations on out-of-state
sellers.22 It is a tremendous and impressive undertaking. But it has some potential flaws.
Quite possibly, the same political and social forces that melted our fiscal ice caps will
keep the states from genuinely reforming.
To be more specific, I argue that the design of the Agreement leaves itself open to
political influence by the very stakeholders who have driven state tax disuniformity.
Local businesses have powerful incentives, and ample oppportunity within the relatively
weak anti-discrimination protections of the Court’s tax Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
to shape local tax policy to favor themselves. The Agreement, as now drawn up, sets out
a model code for each state to enact and interpret independently, with the threat of some
sanction if they stray too far from the collective ideal. But the sanction mechanism
depends on a three-quarters vote from the members of the Agreement, who are
represented largely by political appointees from their home states, removable at the
discretion of state political actors. Through log-rolling and other similar devices,
member states are very likely to escape any punishment for deviation -- and, knowing
this, will be free to give heed to the cohesive, aggressive demands of in-state businesses.
And state-by-state judicial review will be unlikely to constrain state heterodoxy, as
judges will either themselves be politically dependent or, if independent, unconcerned
with the threat of sanctions.

22

For the history of the SSUTA’s development, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN,
STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX 2-1 to 2-15 (1st ed. 2005).
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Thus, I argue, the SSUTA can only succeed if its Governing Board is reformed in
a way that allows it to influence apolitical state courts, and if the stakeholders who
influence political decisions internalize the costs of state disuniformity. These
considerations, I show, are related. Therefore, I suggest a possible improvement on the
current design, proposing that the federal deductibility of a state’s corporate taxes be
made contingent on a Treasury determination that the state is in compliance with the
SSUTA. The deduction helps to make certain that in-state businesses, who I claim are
the driving forces of disuniformity, have a reason to want the SSUTA genuinely to
succeed. If the Board, freed of their influence, can then produce opinions that rest on
principled application of the Agreement’s nationalizing goals rather than parochial
advantage, it has a hope of swaying state judicial opinion to its way of thinking. Federal
judicial review, although problematic standing by itself, can supplement both ends if
supported by expert federal agency judgment.
This analysis also gives us important clues about the larger puzzle of the design of
interstate institutions. Attempting to reform a system upon which the fiscal future of the
States depends is, of course, an important goal in itself. But I try to show here also that a
close analysis of the SSUTA, and of potential amendments to it, also demonstrates the
weaknesses of some traditional approaches to coordinating state and federal policy. In
particular, this case study, I argue, is strong evidence of the need for a “refereed
federalism,” a vision of federalism in which the experimentation in and competition
between thousands of local jurisdictions is managed and channeled by a system of
officials whose incentives are themselves balanced and attuned to screen out
imperfections in the political market. That conclusion has important implications

9
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especially for judicial efforts to impose national standards in such diverse fields as state
business tax incentives and criminal procedure.
Thus, Part I of this Essay offers a description of the evolution of federal limits on
state power to tax sales originating in another jurisdiction, as well as the shape of the
SSUTA that developed in response. Part II begins the diagnosis of the institutional
design problem to be overcome, by providing an overview of the political economy of
state sales and use taxation. Parts III and IV describe what I see as the central obstacles
for the SSUTA’s success -- in large measure, its failures to resolve the difficulties
uncovered in Part II. Part V describes my solution, and how it addresses the structural
failings uncovered earlier. In the Conclusion, I examine our lessons learned for similar
projects in other fields.
I. An Overview
In order to understand the SSUTA it is helpful first to explore some of the factors
that make it necessary. The most immediate impetus for the Streamlined Sales Tax
Project23 was probably the Supreme Court’s decision, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,
that the Commerce Clause prohibits a state or local taxing jurisdiction from imposing an
obligation to collect sales or use tax on a vendor whose only “physical presence” in the
jurisdiction is the travel of its goods by common carrier to its customers.24 Although the
Court’s ultimate rationale is open to some question, it seems clear that at least one major
determinant on the face of the opinion was that forcing mail-order sellers to cope with the
different taxing rules of literally thousands of different taxing jurisdictions was

23

That is, the Project that gave rise to development of the SSUTA. See John A. Swain & Walter
Hellerstein, The Political Economy of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 605,
609--10 (2005).
24
Quill, 504 U.S. at 311--15.
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inconsistent with the Commerce Clause’s goal of creating a free, open market for
domestic goods.25 In this part I describe the development of the Quill rule, and the design
of the Agreement that the States developed in response
A. Black “Letter” Law
At the time of Quill, the United States included somewhere on the order of 6000
distinct sets of local tax rules.26 Even where those rules were facially similar, each
jurisdiction could litigate the application of its terms, such as whether a particular item or
bundle of items was “tangible personal property” or used in “manufacturing.”27 Each
jurisdiction, in theory, could have its own forms, and the authority to audit sellers to
ensure that they were properly collecting sales and use taxes. Understandably,
nationwide sellers complained -- and still complain -- that the burden of complying with
this welter of rules could be substantial.28
Ultimately, this proliferation of tax rules and burdens had additional, legal,
consequences. Through the middle of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court imposed
fairly drastic limits on state power to tax interstate commerce, using not only the
Commerce Clause (or its negative implications) but also the Due Process Clause.29 In a
series of early cases, the Court held that due process limited a state’s jurisdiction to
impose tax and the obligation to collect tax on its behalf only to entities having sufficient

25

See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Sales and Use Taxes on Electronic Commerce: Legal, Economic,
Administrative, and Political Issues, 34 URB. LAW. 487, 497--98 (2002); Swain & Hellerstein, supra note
23, at 605.
26
Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.
27
Isaacson, supra note 20, at [13]. Isaacson represents the Direct Marketing Association, a trade group of
remote-selling merchants. Id. at [1].
28
Isaacson, supra note 20, at [3--4]; see Charles E. McClure, Jr., Radical Reform of the States’ Sales and
Use Tax: Achieving Simplicity, Economic Neutrality, and Fairness, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 567, 573--74
(2000).
29
E.g., Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756--57 (1967); Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v.
O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608--09 (1951); Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
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“nexus” with the taxing state.30 Generally, in order to meet this standard, the state had to
show that the entity had some “definite link” or “minimum connection” with the state,
which it could satisfy by demonstrating a physical presence within its borders.31
Similarly, on the Commerce Clause side, the Court often refused to allow “direct” taxes
on interstate commerce, although it was never entirely clear what separated direct from
indirect.32
By 1977, though, both ends of the doctrine had largely been transformed, setting
the stage for a potential revolution in state taxing power. The reach of a state court’s
jurisdiction had expanded, so that even in suits in rem it could reach any entity with
minimum contacts, ties, or relations to it.33 And in the commerce arena, the Court had
rejected formalism in favor of a practical test that appeared to guard primarily against
unfair or discriminatory tax regimes.34 It appeared, then, that there would in the future be
few barriers to states imposing fairly apportioned and non-discriminatory taxes or taxcollection obligations, even on those who sold largely from out of state. Although the
Court’s restatement of the Commerce Clause test for permissible taxes included a
requirement of “substantial nexus,”35 it seemed plausible that that meant only the
minimal nexus imposed by the Due Process Clause.
The Quill case, in 1992, dashed those expectations. Quill, as I’ve mentioned, held
that “substantial nexus” demands some physical presence in a state before the state can

30

Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344--45 (1954).
Id.; see Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
32
Freeman, 329 U.S. at 252. On the uncertain doctrinal meaning of “direct” and “indirect” taxes in this
context, see generally Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
33
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945). The Burger King decision eight years later made this even clearer. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
34
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 285 (1977).
35
Id. at 279.
31
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collect, or demand help in collecting, sales or use taxes from a seller.36 Quill
acknowledged that, under the Due Process Clause, the States were now free to impose
such a tax.37 But it held that “substantial nexus” also embodied dormant Commerce
Clause “concerns about the national economy.”38 In particular, it explained that the
substantial nexus test “limit[s] the reach of state taxing authority so as to ensure that state
taxation does not unduly burden interstate commerce.”39 And, in the threat of imposing
compliance obligations with “6,000-plus taxing jurisdictions,” it found a serious
likelihood that vesting jurisdiction to tax in every one of those jurisdictions would burden
the activities of interstate vendors.40 Its solution was to preserve a pre-1977 “bright-line
rule” setting out a sales and use tax “safe harbor for vendors ‘whose only connection with
customers in the taxing State is by common carrier or the United States mail.’”41
Diversity now had its price: in many cases, states would be forced to tax in-state
businesses more heavily than out-of-state sellers.42 In addition, the Court’s resolution left
it rather uncertain what, precisely, “substantial nexus” would require in any other
circumstance, including any other form of tax.43

36

Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311, 315 (1992). I describe the Quill holding carefully,
because, as we will see momentarily, it is unclear to what extent it has any significance outside the context
of sales and use taxes.
37
Id. at 307.
38
Id. at 312-13.
39
Id. at 313.
40
Id. at 313 & n.6. For a summary of empirical studies of the welfare effects of growing tax regime
disparities, see Bartley Hildreth et al., Cooperation or Competition: The Multistate Tax Commission and
State Corporate Tax Uniformity, 38 STATE TAX NOTES 827, [836--38] (2005). The authors conclude that
the available evidence shows measurable but rather modest costs associated with the existing, pre-SSUTA,
arrangements. Id. As Daniel Shaviro notes, however, these types of estimates for the most part fail to
include additional social costs, such as tax planning, litigation, and lobbying. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 920 (1992).
41
Quill, 504 U.S. at 313-14 (quoting Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Rev., 386 U.S. 753 (1967)).
42
See McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [6]; Shaviro, supra note 86, at 286; MTC, supra note 20, at
[6].
43
Houghton & Hellerstein, supra note 13, at 28; John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A
Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).
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The explicit shift, however, to a pure Commerce Clause rationale had its own
important implications. As the Court repeatedly emphasized, Congress has the power to
overrule its dormant Commerce Clause determinations. Indeed, the Court all but handed
Congress an invitation, explaining that it was overruling any earlier implication that the
Due Process Clause might stand in Congress’ way, and concluding, “Congress is now
free to decide whether, when, and to what extent the States may burden interstate mailorder concerns with a duty to collect use taxes.”44
B. The States Respond: The SSUTA
Thus, although Quill was technically a loss for the States, the opinion did offer
local taxing authorities a potential path to jurisdiction over out-of-state sellers. Over the
ensuing decade-plus, the States developed a two-pronged strategy to realize the
opportunity the Court had offered them. First, the States crafted a compact, known as the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement, in which they sought to harmonize much of
what had grown disparate.45 And, critically, they sought congressional authorization,
under the Commerce Clause, to require sellers to collect their sales and use taxes.46
The structure and history of the SSUTA are described thoroughly elsewhere,47 so
I will mention here only a few brief highlights. The Agreement is a voluntary compact
among the member states.48 Membership is contingent on approval from existing
members.49 Approval is formally granted through the principle governing entity of the
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Quill, 504 U.S. at 317-18; see id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 333 (White, J., concurring).
See Swain & Hellerstein, supra note 23, at 609--10.
46
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 10-1 to 10-2.
47
Walter Hellerstein and John Swain, in fact, already have prepared a brief treatise describing the SSUTA.
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22.
48
Id. at 3-2 to 3-3.
49
SSUTA ' 801.
45
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Agreement, known as, logically enough, the Governing Board.50 I discuss details of the
Board’s composition in considerable length over the next two Parts.
Substantively, the Agreement obliges would-be member states to enact a variety
of amendments to their own statutes or constitutions.51 Perhaps most significantly, the
Agreement sets out a “library” of putatively uniform definitions for all of the myriad of
items that could be subject to sales tax.52 States must then establish a tax “matrix,” in
which they can check off which of these library items they will tax.53 The states cannot
impose a tax on any item that would also be covered by a library definition unless it uses
the library definition of that item.54 States can have only a select number of tax rates,
including rates imposed by sub-state entities such as cities or counties.55 Further, the
states must adopt uniform administrative procedures, also set out in the Agreement.56
The Board will contract with software developers to produce easy-to-use computer
software to incorporate all of the choices and rates set out by each state and locality,
thereby (it is hoped) allowing any out-of-state merchant to comply easily with the tax
rules of every jurisdiction.57
The Agreement has no formal legal status. That is, there is no SSUTA equivalent
of the Supremacy Clause. Just as with other model codes, once states have enacted their
mirror provisions into law, those provisions simply become part of each jurisdiction’s

50

Id.
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 3-3.
52
SSUTA '' 302, 316; SSUTA App. C.
53
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 7-12.
54
Id. at 304.
55
SSUTA ' 308.
56
E.g., SSUTA '' 317--20, 322, 324, 401--04. Each state also can only have one auditing authority. Id. '
301.
57
HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 7-25 to 7-30.
51
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statutory or constitutional scheme.58 In order to obtain membership, however, a new
member state must show “substantial compliance” with the existing Agreement,59 and the
Governing Board has power to sanction, by three-quarters vote, any existing member
who goes out of “substantial compliance.”60 Again, I discuss this mechanism in more
detail in a bit.
Finally for now, the plan of the Agreement is that it will later be complemented
by federal legislation. Several such bills have been proposed over the past several terms
of Congress, although none has yet passed.61 In the main, the federal legislation would
largely overrule Quill, granting SSUTA member states jurisdiction to impose tax
collection obligations on sellers regardless of their “nexus” with the taxing state.62
Various iterations of the legislation have also added some wrinkles to the structure of the
agreement, such as a provision for federal judicial review of Board decisions.63
II. The Political Economy of Tax Chaos
In order to appraise whether the SSUTA is likely to succeed or fail in its goal of
nationwide uniformity, we first have to understand the forces that produced
disuniformity. In one sense, the diversity of state and local sales tax rules is by design.
The Constitution largely preserved state autonomy to tax, albeit often subject to
Congressional oversight.64 There are good, and familiar, policy reasons for that decision.
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See HELLERSTEIN & SWAIN, supra note 22, at 3-2 to 3-3; Isaacson, supra note 20, at [10].
SSUTA ' 801.
60
SSUTA '' 805, 809.
61
Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.2153, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2005); Streamlined Sales and
Use Tax Act, S.1736, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act, H.R. 3184, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003); Internet Tax Moratorium and Equity Act, S.512, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (2001).
62
See McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [10] (summarizing proposed legislation).
63
E.g., Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification Act, S.2153 ' 5(b), 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2005); Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Act, S.1736 '5(b), 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
64
See Charles E. McClure & Walter Hellerstein, Congressional Intervention in State Taxation: A
Normative Analysis of Three Proposals, 2004 STATE TAX TODAY 40-3, at [3].
59
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Different states will have different distributions of needs and resources, so that the most
efficient tax base may vary by region.65 Tax and spending decisions often are reflections
of an underlying notion of distributive justice.66 In a federal system in which citizens are
fairly mobile and local government reasonably democratic, we can likely best enable
everyone to live under a close approximation of their own ideal of justice if we allow
sub-national units to make policy, including tax policy, based on discrete notions of
justice.67 In that way, citizens can shop for the model that best fits their preferences.
Even if we think norms of justice are or ought to be relatively uniform
nationwide, tax federalism has experimental benefits. It is worth describing these in
some detail, because their significance is largely overlooked in Quill. In the so-called
“Tiebout” model of inter-state competition, parallel state efforts to reach similar policy
goals put competitive pressure on states to do the best job, so as to retain citizens and
attract capital.68 Entrepreneurial politicians can win rewards by eliminating inefficiencies
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For example, if our goal is to maximize total utility across a community, we can produce more utility by
taxing more heavily those whose utility curve is more inelastic relative to income and transferring those
resources to those whose curves are more elastic. See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public
Finance in Theory and Practice 277--95 (5th ed. 1989). It is possible that utility curves are more consistent,
or are more measurable, by region rather than nationally.
66
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1231 (2006).
67
See Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 444--47 (2002);
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1497-98
(1987).
68
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERJURISDICTIONAL TAX AND POLICY
COMPETITION: GOOD OR BAD FOR THE FEDERAL SYSTEM? 60--63 (1991); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES ix (2001); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property &
Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 103 (2005); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy
of Federalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 73, 83--85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). The theory
originates with CHARLES M. TIEBOUT, A PURE THEORY OF LOCAL EXPENDITURES, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956), and there is a voluminous literature criticizing, defending, and applying it. Among other criticisms,
later commentators complain that the model assumes, probably counter-factually, that there are enough
different “bundles” of government services that an individual’s choice to live or invest in any one
jurisdiction reveals his or her preference about only a single policy choice in the bundle. E.g., Susan RoseAckerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local
Government, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23, 28 (ed. 1983).
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or borrowing best practices from elsewhere.69 By attracting capital and retaining
productive tax-payers, the politicians are able to deliver more services, thereby making
voters happy and ensuring re-election or election to higher office.70 Even in a system in
which taxpayer mobility is fairly limited, there can still be competitive pressures. For
example, high-earning taxpayers could merely threaten to exit in order extract rents,
leaving local politicians in the position of having either to pay, and reduce the quality of
services delivered to everyone else, or refuse to pay, and face the chance of a strong
negative signal (exit by the most successful) to their constituents.71 In order to avoid that
position, the politician must make certain that her jurisdiction is so obviously better than
the alternatives that threats to leave are not credible. Again, then, in theory state diversity
can lead to efficiency gains for the whole system.72
Of course, there is such a thing as too much of a good thing. We expect diversity
and experimentation to converge on more uniform best practices, as states copy the
Another critique objects that individuals, and some capital, are not mobile enough to produce competitive
pressures, an argument I discuss briefly in the main text. Shaviro, supra note 40, at 907, 964. There also
are a number of potential vices associated with competition, which it is not my intention to dwell on
extensively here. But, among other claims, competition in a system in which some governments have
unequal resources may distort the market for good government. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism, Part
II---Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349--352, 415 (1990).
69
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 208--09 (1997).
70
PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF Federalism 17--18, 25 (1995).
71
Timothy Beasley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick
Competition, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 30--31 (1995); Bratton & McCahery, supra note 69, at 264-65.
72
There is a spirited debate among economists concerning whether federalism in fact results in more
efficient delivery of government services, particularly those that redistribute resources. Economists who
believe that local services are inefficient argue that the benefits of competition and experimentation are
outweighed by deadweight losses that result from the costs taxpayers incur in researching competing
jurisdictions and relocating. For summaries by some of the primary combatants, see Wallace E. Oates,
Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133-45 (2001); John Douglas Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Tax Competition: Bane or Boon?, J. PUB. ECON.
(2001), available at < http://davidwildasin.us/pub/Wilson-Wildasin.pdf>; George R. Zodrow, Tax
Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union, 10 INT’L TAX & PUB. FINANCE 651--71 (2003).
I take no particular position in that debate here. However, I do argue later that the possibility that interjurisdictional competition could be beneficial, and the complexity that evidently surrounds any true
measure of that benefit, are reasons that we need to design a policy-making structure that is capable of
analyzing the question thoroughly and openly.
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superior efforts of their competitors.73 For example, states compete to develop the most
attractive sets of tort and contract law, but over time there will be pressure on states to
adapt the model that is most effective in drawing in capital and taxpayers.74 And
familiarity is a virtue: it may be more costly to analyze a new set of rules, or to learn to
comply with them. As Daniel Shaviro has explained, each new set of tax rules and
enforcement procedures creates additional costs for multi-jurisdictional sellers across the
nation, some of them simply deadweight losses, so that diversity may lower nationwide
wealth, and increase costs for consumers.75
So in fact it may be a bit of puzzle why state and local taxation is so disuniform.
Shaviro, though, offers a compelling account of the political economy of disuniformity.
The key to his analysis is the observation that voters and purely in-state businesses do not
fully internalize the benefits of a uniform set of national rules, because the gains of that
benefit are distributed nationally.76 That is, the benefit of a marginal increase in
uniformity to the in-state actor is not congruent with the benefit that increase produces for
the nation as a whole.77 Therefore, when weighing the gains of uniformity against
disparate policies that benefit only them, local voters won’t act in a way that maximizes
overall social welfare.

73

See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 12 (William J. Baismol ed. 1972); Wallace E. Oates,
Decentralization of the Public Sector: An Overview, in DECENTRALIZATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND
MARKETS 43, 53 (Robert Bennett ed., 1990).
74
See David A. Rice, Product Quality Laws and the Economics of Federalism, 65 B.U. L. REV. 1, 55--58
(1985). Admittedly, “best” practices may turn out to be, from some perspectives, the worst. “Races,” as I
suspect the reader knows, can be both to the top and to the bottom. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Richard P.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1216--17 (1992).
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Shaviro, supra note 40, at 919--21, 925--26 (1992).
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Shaviro, supra note 40, at 957--58; see McClure & Hellerstein, supra note 64, at [11] (arguing that
essential problem SSUTA is designed to confront is that states do not bear cost to vendors of complying
with differing tax regimes).
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See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172--83 (1920).
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Moreover, as Shaviro also explains, even if each individual voter fully realized
the gains of national uniformity, his or her political representatives might not. Public
choice theory predicts that government officials respond not only to the number of voters
who prefer an outcome but also to the intensity of their expressed preference.78 Where
the gains or harms of a problem are spread widely and thinly, each affected individual is
unlikely to recognize the problem, inclined to assume that someone else will be
motivated to solve it, and, even if aware of and motivated by the issue, may find it
difficult to find others who feel similarly with whom to form a coalition.79 Since the
costs of disuniform or unpredictable laws are spread widely and thinly, neither uniformity
nor reasoned consistency are apt to generate intense voter interest.80 Thus, the
beneficiaries of uniformity often lose out to those who can realize greater gains from the
disparate set of rules.
Although Shaviro does not fully flesh out how this analysis plays out in the
specific context of sales and use taxes, it is not difficult to construct scenarios in which
differing local rules could disproportionately benefit a local constituency.81 One involves
preserving “home-field advantage,” as it were. Let’s consider Jurisdiction A. Existing
merchants in A would certainly benefit from the opportunity to sell in neighboring B and
C without having to study and adapt to new rules. But the merchants in A want B and C
to change to the A rules, not the other way around. They are already expert in the A
rules, while new competitors will have to adapt; the A merchants may already have
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George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971),
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ANTHOLOGY 399, 402 (Thomas O. Sargentich ed., 1994).
79
See Olson, supra note 3, at 11--16, 21--22, 31, 35, 46--48.
80
Shaviro, supra note 40, at 931--32.
81
Shaviro does mention in passing the possibility of “inducing state tax competition to provide investment
incentives,” Shaviro, supra note 40, at 958, which could presumably include exemptions from sales tax.
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designed their existing business processes to maximize profits under A’s rules; and the A
rules may represent the long-term efforts of A merchants to extract favorable rules from
A politicians.82 Further, the A rules might be explicitly protectionist, in that they may be
designed to favor the A merchant manner of doing business over others. For many A
businesses, losing all of these benefits is likely much more costly to A merchants than
gaining access to other markets. At the same time, A politicians may be perfectly happy
that disuniformities make it harder to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, because that
helps to lock in A businesses, insulating the politicians from the danger that valuable
business will flee elsewhere or demand more hold-ups.
Relatedly, state tax bases might change frequently in order to maximize
opportunities for tax exporting. All else being equal, we would expect state actors to try
to shift the burden of paying for their government services onto others.83 It is not
surprising that Delaware is funded heavily by corporate registration fees and tolls at the
Delaware Memorial Bridge, or that Florida employs hotel and sales taxes instead of an
income tax.84 Assuming the tactics I mentioned in the last paragraph are not perfectly
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Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation:
Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 278--79 (1990) (explaining how
interest groups develop stakes in legal status quo favoring the jurisdiction in which they are expert).
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See Ernest Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE
L.J. 219, 228--33 (1957); Jesse H. Choper & Tung Yin, State Taxation and the Dormant Commerce
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Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091,
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successful in preventing business and labor from migrating and developing,85 state
legislatures might rationally shift bases in order to maximize the extent to which the state
can impose a heavier burden on out-of-state actors.86 Alternately, as Shaviro also
suggests, even the illusion of successful exporting may win political rewards for state
politicians.87
On the other hand, in the specific context of sales and use taxes we can in fact
identify a discrete group that is heavily impacted by disuniformity: large out-of-state
remote sellers, such as catalog companies and internet retailers, the Land’s Ends and
Amazons of the world. The problem these entities face is that, assuming they can find
something other than votes that might be of value to legislators (cough, cough), they still
face the immense challenges of monitoring and lobbying in thousands of jurisdictions
simultaneously. The conventional solution for groups in that position in the United States
has been to seek pre-emptive federal legislation, so that battles need be fought only in a
single arena.88 Here the powerful tradition of (and, arguably, constitutional entitlement
to) state tax autonomy may have been an insuperable barrier to that strategy.
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If businesses can easily relocate, tax exporting is unlikely to work because the out-of-state business will
simply move to avoid efforts to impose tax on it.
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See Daniel N. Shaviro, State and Local Taxation: The Current Judicial Outlook, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 279,
282, 288--89 (1993). The Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause tax cases, in theory, are supposed to limit
state opportunities to discriminate against outsiders. As a practical matter, though, there are many tax rules
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to favor the home team. Shaviro, supra, at 288--89. The classic example in state taxation is “formulary
apportionment,” the method by which states determine what portion of a multi-state corporation’s revenue
should be taxed in each jurisdiction. States are permitted to allocate based purely on the proportion of a
corporation’s sales in the state, which obviously greatly favors in-state exporters over primarily out-of-state
importers. MTC, supra note 20, at [11]. In the sales and use tax context, states can simply define their
exemptions to leave strong home-town industries lightly taxed. See Hildreth et al., supra note 40, at [839].
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Uniformity in tax rules, therefore, may be something of a tragedy of the
commons. In many situations, uniform rules and open borders are utility-maximizing.
But each individual jurisdiction, for political and self-serving economic reasons, can
exact greater benefits than other participants by deviating a bit from the uniform system.
As each jurisdiction pursues that strategy, we end up with mostly deviation and not much
uniformity.
III. “Neither Streamlined Nor an Agreement…Discuss”
So the SSUTA, as we saw in Part I, sets up an elaborate structure aimed at
bringing uniformity to sales and use taxes. In the last part, we saw the forces arrayed
against the SSUTA’s proponents. The question now is whether the Agreement, as it
presently is structured, can weather the assault. Thus, in this Part I consider how the
institutions set up by the SSUTA are, based on what we know about the performance of
public officials, likely to respond to the political-process pressures we saw in Part II. My
prediction here is that they, like the state legislators who drafted our many diverse sales
tax rules, will bend.
A. Restarting the Clock?
The central structural challenge for the SSUTA is that it must be enacted,
enforced, and interpreted separately in each state. Again, the Agreement functions as a
model code; each member state agrees to enact legislation conforming its own code to the
definitions and procedures of the SSUTA.89 The Agreement specifically provides that
member states and their officers cannot be sued for failure to conform their law or
behavior to the Agreement.90 Despite an admirable effort on the part of the drafters, the
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SSUTA §1102; see Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 3-2.
Id. § 1103(B), (C).
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SSUTA’s library definitions are not self-interpreting.91 Even if the terms were so clear as
to need no further gloss, there will be facts and circumstances that we can’t now
anticipate that will arise, and demand interpretation.92 Taxpayers will attempt to find
nuances of the terms most favorable to their positions. Those controversies will be
resolved like all other tax controversies; they will begin with administrative proceedings
before state and local tax authorities, and be settled, ultimately, by state courts.93
As a result, the SSUTA potentially might merely reset the clock on state taxing
disparities. That is, although it restores an initial state in which all jurisdictions have the
same set of taxing rules, over time the rules could again diverge widely. The same forces
that pulled our 7,500+ taxing jurisdictions94 apart in the first place may well continue to
tug on the agencies and courts to whom the model code is entrusted.
Thus, a critical question for supporters of the SSUTA’s general goals is whether
the political-process flaws Professor Shaviro identified as affecting state legislative
outcomes would also bend the path of state agency and court decisions. Skeptics have
claimed, with little analysis, that the flaws will infect administration of the SSUTA, as
well.95 But different institutions behave differently. Before making any predictions, we
have to look closer at the operations of state agencies and state courts.
B. How Will State Agencies Perform?
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See Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 4-5; Isaacson, supra note 20, at [10]. For example, the
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See Hellerstein & Swain, supra note 22, at 1-1 (noting that there now are “more than 7,500 local taxing
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See Isaacson, supra note 20, at [13].
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Let us begin by considering the incentives and other factors that are likely to
shape the behavior of state revenue officials. By now it is a familiar point that, although
not directly elected, bureaucrats may still be sensitive to political considerations by way
of legislative or chief executive influence, not to mention the possibility of direct
lobbying.96 Legislatures can control the budget for and procedural rules governing the
bureaucrats, and can use these tools not only to shape deliberative processes but also to
offer rewards and punishments.97 For example, many theorists posit that officials are
interested in expanding their own power and influence (whether out of self-
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For a large handful of sources among the hundreds to choose from on these points, see Jerry L. Mashaw,
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aggrandizement or a belief in their mission), and that legislatures use this desire to align
bureaucratic with legislative incentives.98 That would tend to lead us to conclude that
Shaviro’s predictions about state behavior will also extend to state administration of the
SSUTA’s terms.
On the other hand, the literature also suggests that there rarely is a complete
match between legislative (or even legislative and chief executive) and bureaucratic
goals.99 Some agency personnel may be difficult to monitor, and political actors’
available sanctions may be more costly to the political actor than to the bureaucrat.100
Thus, for instance, some argue that agency personnel have a stronger institutional interest
in preserving the long-term financial stability of the state government than their political
superiors, because they need not balance the need to obtain funds against voter antipathy
to taxes, and their time horizons in their jobs are much longer.101
Even so, any bureaucratic preference for healthy revenues over the long term is
still likely, as with the factors Shaviro identified, to favor local taxpayers over out-ofstate interests. True, free-trade theory predicts that shifting the locality’s tax burden to
foreign payers will reduce tax revenues for everyone, by degrading the efficiency of the
market.102 But that is a very long-term effect,103 and likely to be considerably
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outweighed in the middle term by the possibility of raising rates on a constituency that
has little political influence. However long the agency time horizon, its members are
likely to discount (both rationally and, to some extent, irrationally) the cost of losses in
the distant future.104 And in some cases it is likely that immediate rents, plus interest,
will exceed the cost to the state treasury of any inefficiencies.
Other state revenue agency influences also tend to favor in-state actors. For
example, administrative scholars generally predict that agencies will often be heavily
influenced by the entities they regulate.105 Part of that influence arises from the fact that
the regulated entities have knowledge and experience that the agency needs to do its job
well; another part is familiarity; and a significant portion is the possibility of payoffs in
some form to the regulators.106 Local taxpayers can employ all these tools more
effectively than their rivals. They will have more knowledge about local conditions, will
do business more regularly with their in-state revenue agency than the foreign taxpayer,
and will be more likely to be able to intervene with political supervisors, or offer enticing
future employment, than the out-of-towners.

898--901. Although such losses no doubt affect state revenue officers to some degree, the extent to which
they internalize this harm may reflect only a small fraction of its harm to society.
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At the same time, there is also a thread in the theoretical literature on agency
behavior suggesting that bureaucrats respond not purely to incentives but also to their
own sense of institutional ideology or mission.107 More recent developments in the
psychology of public officials offers a causal explanation for the power of an individual’s
sense of mission, or “role-norm.” Both the individual and society may expect certain
kinds of behavior from persons who hold that individual’s office, and the individual may
experience shame, embarrassment, fear of lost identity and social status, or cognitive
dissonance -- all powerful internal forces -- when she deviates from those expectations.108
Thus, the bureaucrat’s perception of social expectations, and internalization of them, can
lead her to resist entreaties to heed other political forces.109
It isn’t clear how the influence of institutional norms would likely cut for
administration of codified SSUTA provisions. Even if there were a norm that state public
servants should regulate in the “public interest,” it seems very doubtful that there would
be a clear norm that the public to be served is the nation rather than the state. There
seems no apparent reason why the existence of the SSUTA, standing alone, would lead to
a norm of national welfare-maximization. It is true that laws, as a source of expectations
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Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 317 (1977); Mark Tushnet, Non-Judicial Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEG. 453, 455 (2003).
108
See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 131 (1989); BERNARD GUERIN,
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about how we will behave, how it is “right” or “wrong” to behave, and perhaps as an
heuristic for how we believe other people are behaving, probably can significantly shape
norms.110 The SSUTA, though, on its face is only a collection of definitions and
procedural rules. If it announces a new norm of national tax harmonization, it does so
only very subtly. But perhaps Congressional approval, and state ratifications, might
contain or be accompanied by powerful and public dedications of commitment to national
unity, which might be of some help. And yet, as I have argued elsewhere, norms of
commitment to higher principles may dissolve under the pressure of cynicism about the
behavior of public officials.111 Here, for instance, as citizens and officials in State A see
that State B is “cheating,” the expectations for State A officials might quickly diminish.
Developing a strong nationwide norm among state officials could, as a result, be very
difficult, because any cracks in the wall might quickly spread.
In short, without a strong tool for ensuring nationwide compliance, it seems
unlikely that we will see national uniformity develop spontaneously from the behavior of
state-level administrators.
C. The Performance of State Courts
The state judiciary may be unlikely to do much better. As other commentators
have observed, state courts have their own structural features that can tend to make them
inclined to favor local interests over national, or at least non-local, goods.112 The vast
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majority of state courts are elected, and many state judges depend either on campaign
contributions or intensely motivated grassroots support to win elections.113 State judges
may, like administrators, prefer empire-building; that is, they would rather make their
own doctrine than have to follow a set of rules set out by someone else.114 They then can
more clearly take credit for the results, especially if the result favors their constituency.
And there is basically no federal jurisdiction to entertain challenges to any aspect of a
state tax system, assuming the state provides its own forum.115
There are, however, some defenders of state courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court. These defenders often insist that state courts are, or at least must be presumed to
be, equally as committed as federal courts to the defense of federal rights.116 Although
they do not generally develop a strong explanation for that assertion, they often claim that
state judges are at least as “conscientious” or “principled” as federal judges.117 In other
words, the claim of state and federal judicial equivalency is a claim about the common
institutional ideology or role-norm of judges. I agree that the process of internalization of
rule-of-law norms is largely what we think makes courts act like courts: judges have an
ideological or deep psychological commitment to behaving in the way we expect judges
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to behave.118 The Supreme Court, I have argued, has labored to control inferior courts by
setting out (largely informally) a code of behavior for judges, an “institutional ideology”
of principled behavior it expects judges to follow.119 We could see the Court’s frequent
pronouncements that “[s]tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation
to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law”120 as part of its more general
project to encourage a norm of obedience to precedent among its lower courts.
Even if this project is effective, it does not particularly help to maintain sales and
use tax uniformity. Once Quill is displaced by the SSUTA, there will be few federal-law
constraints on the content of state law. As a result, even a very strong norm that state
judges must set federal law above local interests will do little to maintain consistency
between jurisdictions, unless there is something in the SSUTA itself that requires that.
To the extent that the judicial institutional norm is not simply “follow federal law,” but
“set national interests above local interests,” it is unclear how much work such a norm
can do in resisting local diversification. Remember, again, that diversity can also be a
national good. It will be very unclear, viewed from the perspective of a single local tax
controversy, whether the additional diversity that would result from a non-uniform
decision is a useful experiment or a destructive deviation. Even a very principled
nationalist court will often be at a loss as to how national interests should cut in any given
sales tax dispute. And, again, state courts may be demoralized by failures of others who
in theory are supposed to comply with the same set of national-interest norms.
D. The Risk of Sanctions as Reform
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The SSUTA does, however, offer a pair of mechanisms apparently aimed at
containing these problems, although both have their own vulnerable points. First, under
Article IX of the Agreement, states or other persons or entities can petition the Governing
Board to issue a definition, or refine a definition, of any disputed term.121 In addition, the
Board has the power to find that a member state is not “substantially compliant” with the
Agreement, and to impose an appropriate sanction.122
The difficulty for Article IX is that, again, states and their interpreters are not
bound by the Board’s determinations. States are not obliged to codify new interpretations
under Article IX.123 Nor need state courts or administrators agree with the views of the
Board. This is not to say that Article IX opinions will be useless, but much may depend
on the form and quality of Governing Board decision making. Obviously a wellreasoned, persuasive, and objective opinion will be more likely to induce state courts to
follow it, if for no other reason than that the rhetorical burden on a dissenting court to
articulate an opposing view will be correspondingly high.124
On a more fundamental level, a highly “principled” Board will likely be far more
effective than one that is ruled simply by competing political impulses.125 Suppose again
that state courts, perhaps even state taxing authorities, are similarly principled, at least to
a fair extent. There is a good argument that the Board’s judgments will be more
121
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persuasive to such a body if the judgments are recognizably based on the same sorts of
considerations that the body itself entertains – are obviously “legal” and not political.
The difference is the difference between citing, in a brief, the decision of a sister circuit
as persuasive authority and citing the results of a public opinion poll on the same subject.
The “principled” court believes, rightly or wrongly, that legal reasoning is what it
engages in, and will have to engage much more directly arguments presented in the same
mode. A principled approach also makes it easier for state courts to resist local political
pressure to reach an outcome different than the Board’s, because it provides the court
with the rhetorical claim that it is simply “following the law” rather than enacting the
political preferences of an out-of-state majority.126 We can see something of the same
effect in the federal administrative law tendency for courts to find more “persuasive”
administrative decisions that remain consistent over time.127 That rule helps to protect
private planning, of course,128 but it also seems to reflect a judgment that a consistent
position across administrations evinces a more principled stand, rather than a convenient
political one. In any event, it remains the case that even a highly principled Board with
highly principled state courts can at most expect to be highly persuasive, not controlling.
The Board’s persuasiveness will be further constrained by an ambiguity in its
fundamental structure. If we look to how courts (federal courts, at least) have treated
other institutions’ interpretations of the other institutions’ own judgments, we see two
main threads. One thread follows the legislative history paradigm. Courts typically
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accord little weight to the views of a subsequent Congress about the meaning of an earlier
enactment.129 Another thread is agency interpretations of the agency’s own rule, where,
in contrast, the agency will usually receive overwhelming deference.130 The difference
is, basically, a difference in judicial attitudes about the appropriate scope of the other
institution’s authority. If we want the institution to move slowly, and to have to
deliberate carefully and reach specific agreement before its rules can take effect, we give
little heed to opinions issuing from only a portion of the body, especially those
attempting to modify the meaning of earlier, more formal enactments.131 If we prefer
flexibility and quick responses, with not as much regard for transparency, we allow easy,
informal modifications.132 It is not particularly evident from the design of the SSUTA
which model the States had in mind. At a minimum, then, we should expect some courts
to take a “legislative history” approach, and give relatively little weight to Article IX
opinions.
Of course, the Board is not limited to speaking softly; it also can sanction states it
finds not “substantially compliant” with the Agreement. Presumably, Article IX rulings
could be used in concert with the substantial compliance power to assure that, even as the
world changes, the essence of the underlying SSUTA remains fairly constant. Much
therefore turns on the form and efficacy of the Board’s sanctions. If the main effect of a
sanction is political, and courts are apolitical, they may be largely indifferent to sanction.
If our target is political courts or revenue authorities, we have to determine what the
relevant constituency for those entities is, and what size and sort of sanction will be
129
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sufficient to move them to invoke their influence with the relevant state decision makers.
Most importantly, the Board must have the capacity to make these determinations, and
the political will to follow them through.
In addition to persuading or incentivizing, the Board also may have the capacity
to affect the norms of state-level actors. As we saw, the power to curb the occasional bad
actor -- and the expectation that that power will be exercised -- may play an important
role in sustaining developing norms of national interest among state officials and judges.
Also, prominent sanctions, like criminal penalties, may serve their own norming
function,133 although perhaps there is also a risk that they might simply increase the
salience (that is, the visibility) of non-compliance by the sanctioned parties or “crowd
out” individuals’ desire to comply absent the threat of sanction.134 In any event, there
also may be a substantial risk that if the Board members are parochial or self-serving in
their sanction decisions, they will offer a highly salient example of regionalism that could
undermine efforts to develop a nationalist norm in the States.
Thus, whatever we think of the principle or political dependence of state
interpreters, the long-term prospects for uniformity under the SSUTA look to depend
largely on how the Governing Board functions. I turn there in the next part.
IV. Can the Governing Board Govern?
So the central challenge for the SSUTA, again, is that it creates not a single sales
and use tax code but rather fifty parallel, albeit initially very similar, codes. But, we’ve
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concluded, that may not be a serious problem if there is effective centralized coordination
and oversight. Unfortunately, as I outline here, the current design for the SSUTA’s
central authority, the Governing Board, is not promising.
A. The Board’s Operations: The Mechanics
It may be helpful at this point to review the structure of the Governing Board.
The Board is governed not only by the Agreement itself but also by a set of bylaws as
well as an evolving list of “Rules and Procedures.”135 The Board is comprised of up to
four representative from each member state, but each state receives only one vote.136 As
for the Board members themselves, the member states, it appears, are free to decide for
themselves how to select the representative, but the expectation (and current reality) is
that most are state elected officials or commissioners of revenue.137 Compliance Review
committee representatives “must be executive or legislative branch employees of the
member state.”138 Board representatives are not compensated, but can receive
reimbursement for expenses.139
At present the Board’s decision making mechanisms are still only bare bones.
Requests for interpretation are forwarded to a “Compliance Review and Interpretations
Committee” for recommendations to the Board.140 The Committee must solicit
comments from the states and the general public.141 All final decisions are public, and
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posted on the Board’s website.142 A three-quarters vote of the Board is required to adopt
any interpretation.143 For the most part, the Board’s meetings must be open.144 The
Board has the authority, as yet unexercised, to create an issue resolution procedure,
including the use of non-binding arbitration.145 The Board must still vote to approve any
recommendation that is produced by its resolution procedures.146
The sanctions process is similarly sketchy. The only sanction specifically
mentioned is expulsion from the Agreement, although the Board has authority to impose
“other penalties as determined by the governing board.”147 Again, it takes a threequarters vote of all member states to impose any sanction.148 Crucially, a state can be
sanctioned only where it is not “compliant.”149 States must certify annually that they are
in compliance, and the Board is supposed to develop procedures for responding to a state
admission that it is not in compliance.150 A state is in “compliance” when it is
“substantially compliant” with the Agreement.151
B. The Flaws
This combination of a three-quarters vote requirement and a “substantial
compliance” standard for imposing penalties rather obviously portends a fairly sluggish
enforcement operation. By itself, though, that is not necessarily a fatal flaw. As we saw
earlier, there is a fair argument that courts, perhaps even revenue agencies, in the
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individual states could on their own pursue a fair degree of uniformity, if there were
strong, principled leadership from the Governing Board. It might not matter that the
Board moves slowly and seldom, if it moves wisely. But I am skeptical that in its current
design it is likely to do that, either. I see four broad sets of problems.
First, political process failures at the state level may readily be transmitted to the
Board by way of individual states’ influence over their Board representatives. Board
members serve at the pleasure of the appointing state. Administrative law scholars argue
convincingly that, in the absence of some external constraint on the appointer, at-will
appointees will closely reflect the political preferences of their appointer.152 Obviously,
if the position has any value to the appointees, they have an incentive to remain. Even if
that incentive fails to operate, in instances where the appointee deviates too far, she will
be replaced with someone more tractable, unless the costs of replacing her exceed the
costs of her intransigence. There is no obvious reason here why states would be reluctant
to remove appointees who fail to represent fully the interests of the appointing state
officials. Publicity over removal, for instance, seems likely only to increase the
appointer’s support among constituents who oppose the appointee’s positions. One
possible constraint on removal is that an appointee with long tenure may develop ties to
152
E.g., Stephen Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-Century, 47
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Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687--92 (1988) (assuming that power to remove implies power to control
executive officers); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (“[I]t is quite evident
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other Board members, or other institution-specific expertise, that would make replacing
her somewhat costly.153 But that would represent a long-term cost, and a fairly difficult
one to measure. The appointee’s specific adverse vote (or proposed vote), however, on
an issue known to the appointer’s constituency, would represent a clear and immediate
political cost to the appointer.154 Thus, the appointee’s replacement cost is unlikely to
prevent her removal over any publicized policy issue, and she will probably be aware of
that calculus.155
The possibility of logrolling likely will make this state influence a significant
factor in Board outcomes. Obviously, a single state cannot by itself vote down a sanction
aimed at its deviant tax scheme -- indeed, states must abstain from sanction votes against
themselves.156 The state can, however, logroll; it can trade its vote on matters in
exchange for votes against sanction. In a body of diverse interests, especially one with a
high vote threshold, logrolling is inevitable.157 That is not to say logrolling is bad; often,
it is utility maximizing, in that it permits voters for whom a particular outcome is utilitypositive to attract votes from those for whom it is either a matter of indifference or a
smaller utility-negative.158 The peril to the public may come if there are significant
agency costs or other market breakdowns, as where representatives are indifferent to an
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outcome because they fail fully to internalize the costs of the outcome to their
constituents.159 In that case, the indifferent voter trades off her vote for too little, so that
the end result is a net-negative utility outcome for the public.160
As a result, the Board probably will perpetuate the problem that state tax decisionmakers do not internalize the costs of disuniformity. Board members represent the
political constituency of their appointers. As we have seen, these voters, in turn, do not
fully internalize the benefits of a uniform set of national rules – again, because the gains
of that benefit are distributed nationally.161 Thus, it is probable the Board will often be
willing to trade a more-uniform rule for one granting or permitting deviations that result
in disproportionate benefits for one group of Board voters.162
Moreover, to the extent that there are parties who do suffer the full pains of
disuniformity, the Board also seems not to alter Shaviro’s prediction that there will be no
stable coalition in favor of reform. As we saw in the pre-SSUTA scenario, businesses
who sell taxable products in multiple jurisdictions might plausibly form a potent lobbying
bloc, although their influence there was limited by their need to monitor and lobby
thousands of taxing jurisdictions. Under the SSUTA, their situation is somewhat
improved; while they still must monitor developments in every taxing jurisdiction, they
probably need only lobby the fifty states that appoint Board members. Further, the
SSUTA gives the business community a quasi-formal role in decision making, through
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the medium of a “Business Advisory Council,” whose precise operation is at present
unclear.163 On the other hand, the business community will repeatedly be fractured
between businesses whose interests are solely in uniformity, and those who have the
opportunity to benefit from a disuniformity, as from one favoring local businesses.164
These disuniformity rents may often be highly salient for the business.165 If so, the prouniformity coalition will likely be unstable. While these factors are somewhat
unpredictable, on balance it seems that the influence of business as a force for uniformity
will be at best uneven.
In addition, it is unclear that even businesses who would benefit from uniformity
and principle will in fact prefer them to the opportunity to extract disuniformity rents for
themselves in the future.166 Consider, for example, the recent litigation over the tax
breaks Ohio offered to Daimler-Chrysler in order to entice it to build an auto
manufacturing plant in state.167 The vast majority of states’ attorneys general filed an
amicus brief in the Supreme Court supporting Ohio,168 notwithstanding the fact that, as
an economic matter, what was probably happening was that the states were being forced
163
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into a race to slash taxes the lowest in order to attract businesses.169 These targeted lower
tax revenues, for the most part, hurt business, because they result in fewer services and/or
a heavier tax burden on the rest of the tax base.170 Yet the state AG’s pressed on in favor
of targeted tax breaks – arguably exactly because significant business constituencies
threatened to go elsewhere if they did not do so.171 Collective action problems aside,
what may have lined up these businesses in favor of tax breaks was the hope that
maintaining a system in which they could obtain their own big break would outweigh the
costs of giving some breaks to others.172
These political effects might be of little moment if the Board were charged with
interpreting a highly detailed and fairly rigid set of legal rules, which might leave little
play for vote-trading or political influence. Instead – and this is the third problem – the
most pertinent legal provision before the Board in every sanction case will be the
remarkably open-textured term “substantially compliant.”173 The uncertainty of the
meaning of “substantial” is not simply lexical. There are at least three major theoretical
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open questions standing behind the concept of substantiality. The most important is the
Quill dilemma I’ve already described – whether in fact it is better to have perfect
uniformity, or whether some diversity actually serves national interests by enabling
innovation and a spur to competition.174 Quite probably, the Board should have the
power, and the policy goal, of permitting some differences among states in order to foster
valuable experimentation.
Two other substantiality concepts are thorny but not as important to the goals of
the project. For one, it is unclear whether an individual state should bear the cost of
deviations by others. That is, a single definition, in the context of an entire state code, is
unlikely by itself to be viewed as rendering a state not substantially in compliance. But if
every jurisdiction gets “one free deviation,” then we quickly have a patchwork again.
Yet if we view each state’s substantiality in the context of whether the system of rules
already has exceptions, then states will have an incentive to be the first to deviate. It is
similarly difficult to say how we should treat state choices in enforcement or auditing. If
a state’s code nominally complies, but it is clear that the state will not enforce some
provisions it disfavors, is the state in compliance? If we say yes, we come very close to
dictating how states choose to allocate scarce enforcement funds among competing
policy priorities. But if we say no, substantial compliance may be meaningless.
The point here is not that these problems are insuperable, only that they are highly
debatable. So there will actually be a fairly principled argument against uniformity in
many cases. Thus, even if there were a strong demand among some portions of the
public for principled interpretation by the Board, it would be fairly easy for the Board to
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evade. The Board could almost always appease individual interest groups, while giving
at least lip service to demands for principle by others.
That leads us to the fourth problem. The danger of using principle as a cover for
rent-seeking is not serious if we think that the Board will genuinely internalize demands
or expectations of principled behavior. As with state-level bureaucrats, or state courts,
the Board could itself develop an institutional mission that might lead it to resist rentseeking. Right now, however, that looks unlikely. The Board is composed of political
appointees removable at will, so that there would be little reason for the public to expect
them to resist popular pressure. In contrast to, for example, Commissioners of the
European Union, who must pledge to represent the interests of the EU over those of their
home nation,175 the Board members have no obvious institutional mission. Even if they
did, the Board members are not full-time employees. It is doubtful that being a weekend
Board member will be as important to the members’ sense of identity and self-worth as
their full-time job, so that the corresponding importance of fulfilling any role-norms will
be diminished.176 The Board also may not have the budget for full-time staff, and its
performance in their absence may be so low as to diminish any public expectations for
better, which would further ratchet down pressures on the Board to do better.177
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And so we were hoping that principled, or at least frequent, Board sanctions could
influence state-level actors, upon whom the SSUTA ultimately depends. But the Board
alone may not be capable of delivering such sanctions. Thus, at the risk of invoking, in
the physicist Richard Feynmann’s memorable phrase, a tower of “turtles all the way
down,” we also should examine whether there are yet other layers of review that could in
turn discipline the Board. Two possibilities leap immediately to mind: Congress and
federal courts. I consider these two in turn.
C. What About Congress?
The Governing Board has flaws, but it does not exist in isolation. In thinking
about the Board’s performance, we also need to consider the possible influence of other
interested parties. For example, Professor Swain, in his thoughtful article describing the
SSUTA, argues that Congress will have a strong influence on Board behavior.178 He
claims that fear of further congressional meddling after federal ratification of the SSUTA
would ensure that the Board protected the purposes of the legislation.179 With respect, I
am dubious.
To begin with what if probably a simplified picture, let us start with what is likely
Congress’ most powerful oversight tool in the administrative arena is the budgeting
process.180 Agencies and other cooperative ventures set up and funded by Congress
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know that each year their performance will be weighed by a budgeting committee, and
that poor performance may result in tighter budgets or increased substantive restrictions
on their use of the funds.181 Greater even than the power of the purse in this process, I
would argue, is the power of certainty. The agency knows that it cannot avoid scrutiny,
or at least must marshall substantial outside forces (as from lobbying from its privatesector regulatory partners) to mitigate the scrutiny it will endure.
Certainty is so important in the oversight context because legislative inertia is
otherwise so pandemic.182 The world is large and Congress is small. Again, this is one
of the key insights that drives public-choice theory: the cost of enacting legislation is very
high, because it is difficult to capture Congress’ attention for long enough to carry out all
the various steps that lead to legislation, and to overcome the doubts, opposing interests,
and presumptions in favor of the status quo.183 Further, given the difficulty of predicting
future results and discerning their political effects, legislators may be reluctant to tie
themselves to the continuing success of legislation that is already enacted.184 At the same
time, the rewards of high-profile claims of ongoing responsibility are less than the
rewards of moving on to new legislation.185 Voter attention tends to be highest at
enactment and rather low afterwards. Thus, the average legislator often concludes that it
is better by far to take credit only for the ribbon-cutting, and remain free to assign blame
181

See Tiefer, supra note 180, at 212--14.
See Hammond & Knott, supra note 96, at 121 (claiming that Congress tends not to exercise its ongoing
supervisory power). For more general accounts of legislative inertia, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 91--119 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1524--25 (1987).
183
See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 66 (2000); Martin Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic
Theory and the Legislative Process, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 850--51 (1994).
184
See Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 32--33; Macey, supra note 82, at 284--85; Morris P. Fiorina,
Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33,
55--60 (1982).
185
See Aranson et al., supra note 104, at 53--54.
182

46

1647433.4

for later failures to bumbling by someone else.186 On the other hand, elected officials do
have important incentives to undertake low-profile involvement in the ongoing
administration of government, as I will return to in a moment.
For now, though, the point here is that Congress may be unlikely to pay attention
to the SSUTA after it is ratified, and the Board will almost certainly suspect as much.
Congress provides no funds, and will have no regularly scheduled oversight of the
Board’s performance. The most pertinent example here is PL 86-272, a statute enacted in
1959 to protect out-of-state sellers from some forms of state taxation.187 Congress also
provided for a detailed analysis and report on the “problems” 86-272 was to address;188 a
thoughtful and interesting report followed; and Congress has done nothing since.189
Nor will there likely be any sustained constituency for congressional oversight. If
we think that Congress, like state-level elected officials, responds to the intensity of
constituent demands, it is hard to see how advocates of uniform state rules will prevail.
Again, the prediction here is that the most intense and persistent participants in debates
about state sales tax rules will be local businesses who might benefit from rules that
disproportionately favor them. If anything, then, Congress’ involvement would be likely
to undermine uniformity, as representatives and senators exert their influence with the
Board in a way that is far from a disapproving (but fairly inattentive) public eye but quite
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well-known and appreciated by the beneficiary.190 That approach is particularly
attractive to legislators because of their incomplete data about public opinion; it is easy
for them to get information about how an active interest group feels about their work, but
rather difficult to obtain information about how the general public will respond.191 As a
result, the legislator with an opportunity to appease an interest group with an action
beneath the general public’s notice is likely to seize it.192
Let us now add yet another layer of complication. Coalitions who approach
Congress seeking legislation or other congressional activity can observe, as we just have,
the possibility of future inattention, or, at a minimum, the need to remain cohesive as a
lobbying force. They will discount to themselves the value of legislation that comes with
these future risks or costs, and therefore be willing to pay a lower price to obtain it.
Accordingly, Congress can extract higher rents by building in stronger assurances of
future performance, such as opportunities for third parties themselves to alert Congress or
police the terms of the deal they have struck,193 or structural limitations on an agency’s
ability to go in a different direction.194 At present, though, we don’t see any of these
features in the present design of the SSUTA or its enabling legislation. At most,
Congress has signals sent to it by, say, dissenting opinions from Board sanction
determinations, or statements from the Business Advisory Council. But Congress,
without devoting close to its full attention, cannot be certain whether these signals are
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genuine or self-serving.195 As a result, Congress’ most effective tools for supervising
those who receive its delegations --- regular budget review, strait-jacket agency
procedures, and third-party oversight -- all seem to be lacking in its relationship with the
Governing Board.
These generalizations may not be fair to all congresspersons. Some legislators
will have a principled attachment to uniform tax rules, or will have ideological or
institutional commitments to state political parties or state government that may cause
them to prize the long-term revenue interests of states over their own short-term political
rewards.196 (One sponsor of the SSUTA legislation, for example, was formerly a state
revenue official.)197 This point, too, though, ends up cutting against uniformity. To the
extent that federal legislators make efforts to please their state counterparts, or are very
receptive to their entreaties, that will only dilute Congress’ power as an independent
check on the state tendency to disuniformity. So our pool of effective overseers must be
drawn from those congressmen who are truly committed to state fiscal stability, and not
simply to being on good terms with state officials. I submit this will be a very small pool,
and that that fact will, again, be quickly evident to the Board.
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In short, much the same forces that produced disuniformity in the first place, and
that will likely entrench it in the Governing Board, are also likely to disable significant
congressional oversight of the Board. And that will be apparent to the Board itself.
D. Judicial Review?
Professor Swain also suggests that judicial review might improve uniformity
under the Agreement.198 Although he does not have much opportunity to elaborate on
that thought in his brief essay, Congress might provide (as it has in several versions of the
SSUTA bill) for review of Board determinations in federal court.199 That, in turn, might
either prompt the Board to give greater heed to national interests, or, failing that, provide
for occasional overruling of egregious Board decisions. As the reader no doubt can
guess, I am not optimistic on this front, either, although I do think that judicial review has
a role to play in any successful redesign of the SSUTA.
The effect of the threat of judicial review on the deliberations of the entity under
review is a subject of dispute across legal scholarship. At the risk of over-simplifying,
the main dispute seems to be whether reviewed entities (to be less cumbersome, let’s call
them agencies, with the understanding that sometimes they are something else) care that
they will be overturned by the court. Some scholars -- Mark Tushnet is a leader on this
side -- claim that judicial review simply creates a sort of “overhang,” where the agency
will deliberately avoid considering the grouds that the court will consider.200 That frees
the agency more completely to fulfill constituent demands. When a court then reverses,
the agency simply turns to the constituents, shrugs, and says, “we did all we could for
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you.” Indeed, in this scenario, the agency arguably benefits from reversal, because it can
extract rents a second time around for its next attempt. Dan Shaviro is also in this camp,
at least on the question of state tax uniformity; he is skeptical that the Supreme Court can
intervene usefully, especially to the extent that its interventions might deter Congress
from itself acting.201
Other writers, including this one, argue instead that constituents and ideologically
committed agency personnel want results, not excuses, and that they have limited
patience for demands for rents from their government.202 It follows that agencies
therefore will be forced to balance the most perfect constituent outcome against the
possibility of reversal. The agency might then select a second-best solution that is
mindful both of constituents and the court. And, crucially, judicial review need not be all
or nothing; judges have available to them a variety of tools that allow them, in essence, to
ask political actors to take a second and more careful look at the challenged outcomes,
often with guidance from the court about which factors deserve more attention or
respect.203 In this way courts can improve the deliberative quality of political
decisions.204
There is another way in which I would argue that judicial review can improve the
deliberations of the Board. As I described earlier, a large part of what we thinks affects
the “principled” character of bureaucratic outcomes is institutional mission and public
expectations. Arguably, a bureaucracy subject to judicial review may come to see itself
201
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not simply as a purely political machine but instead part of the instrumentation of justice.
Judicial review, in other words, may encourage bureaucrats to internalize the rules laid
down by the court, or at least see themselves as part of the “rule of law,” which may limit
the play of political pressures to favor localities.
My concern, therefore, is not with the institution of judicial review, but rather
with its particular design here. Direct review of Board decisions in lower federal courts
implicates all of the structural weaknesses of the federal judiciary. As the Supreme Court
itself has already stated repeatedly, federal courts are not well-positioned to determine the
appropriate balance between state political tax autonomy, with the benefits that diversity
may offer, and the need for national uniformity.205 That inability is precisely why the
Quill Court “punted” the problem of jurisdiction to tax back to Congress.206 Courts
cannot easily measure, and can even less easily track over time, how diverse states have
become, how burdensome those differences are, whether differences are producing
fruitful experiments or races to the bottom, and so on.207 Yet the determination whether a
state is in “substantial compliance,” as we have seen, requires just these judgments.
Furthermore, guesswork by different federal courts, in different districts or circuits, may
result in the same patchwork the Agreement hopes to prevent.208
These problems are exacerbated by the fact that any act authorizing judicial
review of board decisions would likely have to authorize review at the behest of affected
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private individuals. Again, our hypothesis is that state officials themselves are unlikely
vigorously to challenge discriminatory provisions by other states, largely in order to
facilitate logrolling. That logic would seem to extend to state court challenges to Board
decisions. Thus, in order to police disuniformity, we would have to permit the private
interests disadvantaged by a particular provision, or by disuniformity generally, to bring
their own challenges in court. The difficulty there, as I have described elsewhere, is that
private enforcement efforts often further complicate courts’ policy-making efforts.209 For
example, the threat of a private suit will tend to make it harder for any central authority -here, the Board -- to strike a negotiated solution with the alleged offender.210 They may
deprive the court of the experience of the agency that ordinarily brings enforcement
actions.211 They may be less open to the competing public voices that would otherwise
be reflected in a government decision to proceed.212 And there may be lots of them.
Finally, there is an argument that, in providing a basis for judicial review, any
authorizing act would violate the non-delegation doctrine.213 The argument would posit
that federal ratification of the SSUTA would in effect delegate authority to shape the
future content of federal law to an entity remote from federal political controls.214 The
non-delegation doctrine, although now largely a dead letter, is thought to prohibit
Congress from assigning its law-making power to any other entity. Although delegations
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to federal agencies and to states are now relatively unrestrained, delegations to private
actors may be more problematic.215 The Court, it appears, is anxious about its own
ability either to fill in broad swaths of policy content left open by Congress, or uncertain
of its ability to gauge the openness and democratic character of delegations to private
actors.216 The Board’s processes plausibly would implicate both of those problems.
Future interpretations of the SSUTA under the present plan are to be crafted, not by
Congress, and not directly by states, but by a private entity, the Board, which is
incorporated under the laws of Indiana.217 It is unclear that the democraticrepresentativeness and transparency rationales that permit delegation to purely state
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entities would reach the Board. The question, then, is whether the Board is more like a
private entity or a state under these criteria. I think this would be a hard question.218
These concerns about judicial review all have a common thread, and I believe a
common solution. Each reflects the courts’ inability expertly to function as
representatives of national interests. The courts’ connection to popular preferences is
attenuated, and is updated only intermittently by their encounters with individual
litigants. Similarly, the demands of balancing different federalism interests stretches the
courts’ technical expertise and fact-finding ability beyond their current institutional
limits. And there are many courts, with the prospect of a unifying Supreme Court
opinion an unlikely and infrequent one. These are the exact considerations that usually
lead federal courts to rely on, and defer to, the judgments of federal agencies.219 In the
next Part, I suggest how we can get one involved in the decision making process.
V. A Possible Solution
In sum, there is a decent probability that the SSUTA as currently designed won’t
work. Yes, it will permit states to tax out-of-state sellers. And many of its labor-saving
goals, such as computerized and uniform tax reporting and collection, are fine
accomplishments and will function nicely. However, the grandest policy goals of the
Agreement, its ambition to resolve deep tensions between experimentalism and
nationwide uniformity, may not. I suspect there are many possible fixes for the problems
I’ve described. Here I’d like to detail one of them.

218

Cf. FM Props., 22 S.W.2d at 874--75 (setting out eight factors court considers in determining whether
delegation to a private entity contravenes purposes of non-delegation doctrine).
219
E.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); 1 PIERCE, supra note 100, ' 2.6, at 97--98

55

1647433.4

To review, our challenges are several. The foremost is that in-state businesses do
not fully internalize the costs of national uniformity.220 Many unfortunate consequences
flow from that market failure, including the likelihood that the Governing Board set up
by the Agreement won’t have much interest in constraining non-compliance. Judicial
review might, in theory, either improve Board performance, correct its errors, or both.
Direct judicial review of Board decisions, however, looks unlikely to produce better
results, and might even be constitutionally problematic.
The first goal for my proposal, therefore, is to make in-state businesses take more
account of the SSUTA’s uniformity goals. The most direct way to do that is to impose a
financial penalty for businesses in states that are not compliant. States already must
submit an annual assessment of their own compliance.221 I suggest that the federal
deductibility of corporate state and local-level taxes222 should be contingent on a federal
finding that the state collecting the taxes in fact is substantially compliant. The federal
arbiter could impose intermediate sanctions, such as 95% deductibility for all state
business taxpayers. The IRS could serve the arbiter function, or it might be located in an
agency with built-in expertise in consumer goods, such as the Commerce Department.
States and other affected parties could appeal an adverse determination to the Federal
Circuit. Certification and sanctions would be binding on the IRS and taxpayers, and
could not be relitigated in a refund suit or in Tax Court.223
This structure is very similar to many other conditional federal subsidies.
Consider, for example, Medicaid, which provides compensation to states to defray the
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costs of care for the indigent in exchange for meeting a long list of federal conditions,
including approval of the state’s plan for care by the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services.224 The most significant difference is that the subsidy here is a tax
deduction for state taxpayers, rather than a direct grant of cash to the state government.
Why taxes? The key advantage here is that using the deduction helps to remove any
discounting or fiscal illusion that might minimize the impact of subsidies on corporate
incentives. That is, federal block-grant dollars can always be diluted, wasted in
administrative costs, or given over to someone else, so that the rational business manager
may discount their proportional value.225 Further, the less-than-fully rational manager
may fail to perceive the full value of a grant, as where the manager may not properly
calculate the value to her business of federally-subsidized health insurance.226 The
deduction, in contrast, hits the corporation right at its bottom line -- no doubts, no
discounts.227 That makes any penalty more efficient, since the feds need not inflict
additional (sometimes unnoticed) fiscal pain in order to achieve the desired level of
incentive.228 In addition, by a quirk of doctrine, placing conditions on tax benefits
escapes a major set of limitations on conditional expenditures, including a cumbersome
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requirement that all federal obligations be spelled out clearly on the face of the statute.229
There are presently no comparable limits on conditional tax benefits.
Replacing the Board with a federal agency in the compliance certification process
also alleviates many of the concerns we had about the efficacy of judicial review. The
agency will give our reviewing court a much more reliable interpretive partner -- a
partner with a national constituency, predictable and ample staffing, developed expertise,
little obvious self-interest in any particular outcome, and perhaps an institutional mission
in its staff to regulate commerce in the national interest. Agency approval, under federal
APA procedures, will also offer an opportunity for formal public participation in the
outcome by all of the affected stakeholders in a relatively transparent forum.230 That is
not to say that the federal agency will be immune to lobbying by the same constituencies
that affect the Board. Far from it; that is why we still would want judicial review. But,
for the same reasons that we are rather less concerned about delegation to federal
agencies than to private entities -- the greater assurances of transparency and democratic
accountability that come with agencies, whose deliberations are themselves subject to
democracy-reinforcing review -- courts could have much greater assurance that the policy
conclusions arrived at by the agency are reliable and reflect national norms over local
preferences. The court’s ability to rely on its agency partner, in turn, largely mitigates
any danger that the court would have to draw on its own, limited capacity to determine
the right policy outcome.231 Further, centralizing review in a single court (and one
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already with a fair amount of tax experience) allows that court to develop its own
expertise, and eliminates the circuit-split problem.
I do not claim that my proposal would eliminate all disuniformity. That is not its
goal. As I mentioned at the outset, I believe the best approach to state taxation is a mix
of experimentation and certainty. Under my alternative, the Board is still free to issue
new interpretations or amend old ones. The reviewing agency is free to permit some
experimentation, under the large umbrella of “substantial” compliance. Thus, even if the
reviewing agency found that a state’s unique approach was non-compliant, it might
permit it for a period in order to develop data about whether the alternative approach was
better policy, and the Board could utilize that data to revise existing standards. I expect
that the Board and the agency would coordinate to share views about whether a given
deviation should be viewed as an encouraged experiment or local rent-seeking.
It is hard to predict the political viability of my proposal, but I think it not
significantly less plausible than the existing SSUTA structure. Like most precommitment strategies, it requires at least a momentary coalition of the public-minded.232
Whether or not we think states will support my version depends, I suppose, on whether
we think states genuinely want uniformity or are presently only pretending to want it in
order to get jurisdiction to tax out-of-state sellers. Businesses should prefer my plan,
despite what looks like a potential for draconian penalties -- assuming, again, that they
genuinely are burdened by disuniformity, and aren’t simply latching onto that argument
as a basis for resisting sales tax collection duties. So, if nothing else, debate about this
proposal should give us more information about where the sides really stand.
232
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VI. Conclusion
There are several generalizable points that emerge from this case study. The
foremost, I think, is that federalism is not self-implementing. Our first efforts at
implementing state sales tax autonomy were something of a disaster. Unmediated
competition and experiment among jurisdictions, reigned in only by severe and
economically distorting penalties imposed by the Supreme Court when the experiment
threatened the existence of an open market, produced a fairly unhappy outcome.
Everyone, from Court to states to businesses, recognizes that the present regime is fairly
untenable.233
Unfortunately, we have been slow to broaden the scope of this recognition.
Despite its evident failures, we are still using, in essence, the state sales tax model as the
purported solution to a variety of other national policy problems. That is, we permit
largely unmediated competition among state and local actors, with the only regular
intervention a relatively rigid judge-made rule that freezes the competition in place or
draws a bright line beyond which it cannot cross. Consider law enforcement. Localities
may compete to see which can be toughest on crime, pressing the envelope of crimefighting tactics until stung back, occasionally, by the extreme sanction of suppression of
evidence or dismissal of the conviction or sentence.234
This project therefore supports the view, pressed elsewhere by this and other
commentators, that experimentation and competition are best served by a refereed

233

See sources cited supra note 13.
See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2047--2135 (2000)
(analyzing variety of political-process factors that undermine death penalty procedural safeguards).
234

60

1647433.4

federalism.235 As I have shown, to make the most of our federal system, we need to
develop the institutional expertise to evaluate parallel programs, and the institutional will
to implement best practices that may run contrary to purely local interests. Achieving
those goals will often mean that the market, or the market as intermittently regulated by a
fairly limited federal court system, must be supplemented by other actors working in
coordination with courts, with one another, and with private stakeholders.
Thus, designing a system that can accomplish both tasks at once may require
some ingenuity. One particular design lesson the SSUTA experience shows us is the
importance of identifying the incentives of key stakeholders. Once we saw that it was
primarily local businesses who were driving state tax disuniformity, our design task
became relatively simple: find a way to align the incentives of those businesses with our
more general object of balancing local experiments with easy nationwide tax compliance.
These insights could lead to an immediate payoff in a related corner of the law of
state and local taxation. As I discussed briefly earlier, the States face destructive
competition for mobile capital,236 and recently a set of plaintiffs trying to challenge
Ohio’s decision to give up more than $100 million in tax incentives reached the Supreme
Court only to be thrown out on standing grounds.237 Commentators have urged the
Court, again, to follow the sales-tax model in regulating what has become a dysfunctional
market: they argue that the Court should hold that all such incentives are unconstitutional
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under the Commerce Clause.238 Congress, in turn, was preparing to do the opposite,
contemplating a bill, in the event the Supreme Court were to have decided in favor of the
Cuno plaintiffs, that would have given broad authorization to the States to give whatever
investment incentives they pleased to lure businesses.239
I believe my study here shows that both these models are seriously flawed, in that
they are vulnerable either to excessive influence from self-serving interests, or too
inexpert and inflexible to respond nimbly to those interests. As I suggested for the
SSUTA, one way to counter-act both difficulties at once would be to contemplate instead
an institution in which stakeholder input is channeled and shaped by more detached
deliberation, and the deliberation is informed by expert regulators, so that we capture the
healthy impulse of state competition while constraining the prisoner’s-dilemma dynamic
that sometimes results.
Finally, our effort to determine how best to target stakeholder incentives lead us
to one other significant lesson. Our model for coordinated interstate agreements has
usually relied on conditional federal spending. Whether it was health care for the
indigent, education of children with disabilities, or speed limits, we have used the offer of
federal dollars as a carrot to entice state compliance (where outright federal mandates
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were thought undesirable or beyond Congress’ power).240 But tax subsidies can be
carrots, too.241 The SSUTA example, I would argue, shows us an instance where
conditioning tax benefits in the same way we have in the past conditioned direct spending
can be a more efficient way of affecting the behavior of local or private actors.
Federalism, for all its benefits, gives us plenty of headaches in coordinating our many
competing sub-national interests. We should be open to any solution, even one as strange
as conditional business deductions.
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